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The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in the Twentieth Century West: A Comparative-
Historical Perspective on the United States and European Union1
  
One of the primary debates of the post-Cold War era revolves around the pole of 
cosmopolitanism - nationalism, a classic antinomy which presents somewhat of a 
paradox. To wit, since the late 1980s, there has been a clear increase in ethnic conflict, in 
which most of the dramatis personae employ the language of nationalism.2 Dominant 
ethnic communities couch their appeals in the language of 'national' sovereignty, while 
separatist minorities speak of 'national' self-determination.3 But if nationalism is enjoying 
a revival, so too is its arch-enemy. The increasing degree to which organisations, goods, 
people and information cross national boundaries has given rise, since 1960, to the term 
'globalisation.'4 This ferment has in turn revived an older discourse of cosmopolitanism, 
the subject of this work. So it seems that both nationalism and cosmopolitanism are 
enjoying a resurgence.5  
A related paradox arises from divergent trends in American and European foreign 
policy since 9/11. It increasingly appears as if Europe is charting a 'cosmopolitan' path 
while the United States remains an actor focused primarily upon its own national self-
interest. There is much in this argument, whether we explain it as a result of different 
political cultures or, as Robert Kagan, does, in the realist terminology of military might.6 
Yet this article suggests that developments in the political sphere are but one face of the 
cosmopolitan card. The other concerns ethno-culture, and here it is apparent that 
America’s recent drift toward greater political nationalism has had little impact on its 
post-war trend toward cultural cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, the growing political 
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cosmopolitanism of Europe has not always been accompanied by greater cultural 
cosmopolitanism. This partly explains why 9/11 had only a limited impact on American 
ethnic relations while the American ethno-nationalist right has made few inroads as 
compared with Europe.7  
How are we to interpret the cosmopolitanism-nationalism conundrum? In terms of 
normative theory, the cosmopolitan-national question has been hotly debated for a 
decade, with many impressive results in fields such as political philosophy and 
international relations theory.8 Some of the seminal work in this area, notably Chris 
Brown's distinction between 'cosmopolitan' and 'communitarian' theories of I.R. or 
Jeremy Waldron's defense of cosmopolitan ethics, has helped to define the parameters of 
debate for all scholars.9 Nevertheless, with the possible exception of intellectual history, 
comparative and empirical work has largely sidestepped questions of cosmopolitanism.10 
Instead, empirical efforts have concentrated on the relationship between globalisation 
and the nation-state.11  
The equation of 'cosmopolitanism' with normative debates and 'globalisation' with 
the empirical realm is evident even in studies which attempt to bridge these discourses. 
For instance, David Held's pioneering work remarks upon the growth of a global civil 
society of trans-national organisations and the role these play in fostering new forms of 
world solidarity. However, while globalisation is the principal terminological outlet for 
the first (empirical) part of his book, the term cosmopolitanism is reserved for the latter 
section which deals with normative questions in democratic theory.12 In the work of 
many theorists of globalisation, certain classes of supranational organisations owe their 
origin to global civil society (i.e. Amnesty International, Greenpeace), while others 
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appear as the product of 'top-down' functional or realist processes (i.e. IMF, EU).13 
Nevertheless, both functional and civic organisations are subsumed under the rubric of 
'globalisation' and bracketed off from questions of 'cosmopolitanism.'  
This paper suggests that such a device is problematic. Instead, it is more effective 
to use the conceptual division to denote two distinct empirical realms: the 'medium' of 
expanding technological networks and functional interdependencies (a.k.a. globalisation), 
and the 'message' of cosmopolitan ideas and identities. The two greatly affect each other, 
but remain substantially independent social forces. Hence the ideas that flow within 
expanding global networks in one period can be primarily nationalist (i.e. 1789-1914), 
while those that course through national networks may be strongly cosmopolitan (i.e. 
1750-1789, 1945-2000). Only in this manner can one explain the relative 
cosmopolitanism of a poorly-integrated eighteenth century Europe and the subsequent 
nationalism which prevailed in that far more 'globalised' continent a century or two later. 
A recent photo of a Pakistani Islamic militant celebrating the Trade Center bombings 
dressed in a Chicago Bears T-shirt provides a shockingly graphic portrayal of the 
medium-message disjuncture.14 The crucial changes thus need not be technological or 
functional, but rather ideological and ontological.  
This would suggest that cosmopolitanism can assert itself as a source of social 
power independent of globalisation.15 Cosmopolitanism may operate within ostensibly 
functional institutions like the French state, the IMF or the EU or through grassroots 
associations like Greenpeace, the Pan-European Union or the Socialist International. 
Sometimes 'functional' organisations are heavily penetrated - or even constituted - by 
grassroots NGOs.16 More to the point, as we shall see in our case studies, it is frequently 
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the case that lines of influence connect the two. Thus cosmopolitan social movements, 
like their nationalist counterparts, often give rise to political structures and serve to 
revitalise them throughout their lifespan.17  
To reiterate: the praxis of cosmopolitanism remains largely uncharted territory.18 
This paper will provide three new departures from the existing literature: a) a 
consideration of the 'dualistic' nationalist proclivities inherent in much pre-twentieth 
century cosmopolitan thought; 19 b) an analysis of the twentieth century expansion of 
organised cosmopolitanism in the West from its grassroots beginnings to political 
realisation, and its conflict with nationalist social actors; and c) consideration of the 
ethno-cultural nature of cosmopolitanism in the United States and the civic-political 
quality of European cosmopolitanism.  
 
The National-Cosmopolitan Question Revisited 
 
Cosmopolitanism has both its ideological and etymological origins in ancient 
Greece, where the term kosmopolités referred to an individual who considered 
her/himself a citizen (polités) of the world (cosmos).20 We shall denote cosmopolitanism, 
therefore, as an ideology and/or movement for universal community. It matters little 
whether the universalist project is fully elucidated as a millenarian or Utopian vision, so 
long as there are no self-imposed geographical limits placed on those who would spread 
the Gospel. We shall therefore refer to particular supranational and transnational projects 
(such as the EU, dar-ul-Islam or the Peace movement) as cosmopolitan if they compete 
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for loyalty with ethnic or national particularisms and maintain a spirit of deepening and 
extension that is potentially universal.  
Notice that this definition focuses on the transcendence of ethno-national 
congruity, namely the linkage between territory (space) and ancestry (time). However, 
transcending the limits of ethno-national space-time does not imply relativistic neutrality: 
cosmopolitan movements are often strongly particularist in their ideology. On this score, 
proselytising religions (i.e. Christianity) and many empires (i.e. Rome, Soviet Union) are 
as cosmopolitan as the well-travelled voyeurs of the Enlightenment or Modernist 
experimentalists. They, too, must overcome the resistance of those who wish to maintain 
the sanctity of their ethnic boundaries. Further, we should not confuse a cosmopolitan 
movement’s ethno-national source (i.e. Russia and Communism, France and Napoleonic 
Liberalism, Anatolian Turkey and the Ottoman Empire) with nationalism. These were 
universal movements which sprang from ethno-national bases which they transcended to 
a greater or lesser degree over their lifespans. 
Secondly, cosmopolitanism can assume either trans-ethnic or trans-national form. 
Those who seek a trans-ethnic universality which eschews the cultural domination of any 
ethnic group are cultural cosmopolitans, even if they confine their project within the 
boundaries of a particular state. Notice that the above goes beyond Chris Brown's 
definition of cosmopolitanism as the 'refusal to regard existing political structures as the 
source of ultimate value.'21 Our definition is wider, in that it considers as cosmopolitan: 
a) open-ended trans-national and supranational projects; b) those who seek a universalist, 
trans-ethnic community within the boundaries of a particular state; and c) actors who 
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would accord existing political structures some value, albeit less than their transcendent 
project. 
 
Cosmopolitanism and the Nation-State: Cultural and Political Considerations 
 
Linked to the above definition is the belief that cosmopolitanism, as with 
nationalism, sports both political and cultural (or 'civic' and 'ethnic') variants.22 This is 
critical, since the fault line between cosmopolitanism and national phenomena varies 
depending upon the aspect of each (i.e. cultural or political) that we are attempting to 
juxtapose. In political terms, cosmopolitan movements seek to supersede the institutional 
and territorial boundaries of the state. The emphasis here rests squarely on concrete issues 
of power and administrative reach, which the political cosmopolitan seeks to redistribute 
upwards from the state to a relevant supranational actor. Constitutional arrangements thus 
become central, since these stipulate how power is to be divided between the 
cosmopolitan centre and the federal or confederal units (i.e. depoliticised nations). The 
formulae for taking legislative decisions, executing federal power and safeguarding 
individual rights are all implicated in this kind of cosmopolitanism. To a great degree, 
these practical questions are the bane of modern supranational federations like the USSR 
or EU.  
Notice that political cosmopolitanism need make no cultural claims. Indeed, 
beyond the transfer of power upwards and extension of authority outwards, political 
cosmopolitan asks little. In theory, cultural nations could remain the primary foci of 
space-time identity even as a world state assumed a complete monopoly on all functions 
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of government from policing and tax-raising to monetary policy and social services. So 
long as there existed flourishing national civil societies and limits to the trans-national 
mobility of people, the overarching cosmopolitan administration would pose little threat 
to national particularity.23 In fact, cosmopolitan schemes of the past four centuries have 
rarely asked this much, often contenting themselves with some division of powers 
between the centre and the (con-) federal units.24 Moreover, cosmopolitan polities like the 
pre-1900 Ottoman Empire, pre-war USSR and late Hapsburg Empire often accepted the 
permanence of ethno-national identities. 
On the other hand, a corollary of the above is that political cosmopolitanism poses 
an affront to the aims of political nationalists (i.e. separatists), who seek to render cultural 
and political boundaries congruent.25 Unlike cultural nationalists like the Gaelic, 
Valencian or Hindu Revivalists of the nineteenth century, who are content to revive and 
modernise ethnic histories, languages and rituals, political nationalists are fired by the 
liberal aim of autonomy from a larger unit (often an empire or overarching state).26 So to 
the extent that cosmopolitan polities attempt to monopolise political power, they incur the 
enmity of political nationalists. Whether we consider the resistance of Israelite against 
Roman, Serb against Ottoman or Estonian against Soviet, the meeting of political 
cosmopolitanism and political nationalism has been marked by strife. Even on the plane 
of the purely ideational, the two have repeatedly clashed. Hence the special antipathy 
which proponents of political nationalism, from Rousseau to Fanon, have reserved for 
cosmopolitanism.27  
Cultural forms of cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, present little obstacle to 
political nationalists, and vice-versa. Cultural cosmopolitanism can adopt a number of 
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guises, from the intolerant universalising zeal of religious crusaders to the existential 
stance of being a 'world citizen,' which can be traced to the Cynics and Stoics of 
Antiquity.28 The latter, liberal orientation has developed strongly in the past few 
centuries. During the Enlightenment, a number of new facets of liberal-cosmopolitanism 
emerged, notably the cachet attached to foreign travel and the consumption of foreign 
goods, as well as the importance of staying abreast of fashionable trends from the cultural 
centres of Paris and London. This sensibility tended to look askance at patriotic and 
religious enthusiasm as characteristics of the lower social orders, while placing great 
value upon the presence of a world (or at least pan-European) Republic of Letters, knit 
together by the French lingua franca, written correspondence, and Parisian-style salons.29  
More recently, liberal cosmopolitanism has vaulted beyond a mere tolerance 
toward, and mastery of, foreign cultures, toward a 'postmodern' engagement with them as 
an ingredient in self-construction and a tool for weakening the hegemony of the Western 
power centre. 'A…genuine cosmopolitanism is first of all an orientation, a willingness to 
engage with the Other,' remarks Ulf Hannerz. 'It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of 
openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than 
uniformity.' Jeremy Waldron adds that a cosmopolitan is someone who does 'not 
associate his identity with a secure sense of place [or]… take his cultural identity 
[from]…a limited subset of the cultural resources available in the world.' Waldron 
approvingly quotes Salman Rushdie, who declares that 'The Satanic Verses celebrates 
hybridity, impurity, intermingling…it is a love song to our mongrel selves….'30  
This constellation of ideas and liberal cultural practices need not threaten the 
political nation, particularly if limited to a particular lifestyle enclave. Even where 
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cosmopolitan ideas come to dominate at the level of a nation-state's cultural policy (i.e. 
'colour-blind' immigration, 'multicultural' curriculum), they seldom pose a threat to its 
political integrity. On the other hand, cultural cosmopolitans do pose a clear and present 
danger to cultural nations, since at the cultural level, the cosmopolitan-national question 
turns on the status of existential space-time boundaries. Ethnic/national identities are both 
anchored by myths of homeland (delineated space) and ancestry (delineated time).31 
Cosmopolitans wish to supersede these boundaries while nationalists seek to defend 
them. This leads to an insuperable conflict between the cosmopolitan posture – whether 
liberal or otherwise - and the commitments demanded by the cultural nation, which (in 
Regis Debray's words): 
 
With its stress on a beginning and flow in time, and a delimitation in space, raises 
barriers to the flood of meaninglessness and absurdity that might otherwise engulf 
human beings. It tells them that they belong to ancient associations of 'their kind' 
with definite boundaries in time and space, and this gives their otherwise 
ambiguous and precarious lives a degree of certainty and purpose….32  
 
The contradictions between cosmopolitanism and nationalism appear most clearly with 
respect to diverse, large-scale immigration, which can disrupt a cultural nation's sense of 
shared ancestry; or historical revisionism, which can fragment or profane the cultural 
nation's myths and memories. Taken at once, the ascent of cultural cosmopolitanism can 
lead to the attenuation of a cultural nation's sense of continuity, and even to its demise. 
For instance, the decline of ethnic groups as varied as the Sorbs, Wends, Assyrians, 
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Cornish and Polabs can be traced to either mass in-migration and/or to their elites' 
cosmopolitan admiration for cultures other than their own. As one pamphlet for sale in a 
Cornish nationalist bookstore lamented, 'Among the [eighteenth century] Cornish there 
was a diminished feeling or sentiment of national consciousness…They had 'aped' the 
English gentry to the extent they had become provincial English.'33  
The foregoing discussion has highlighted the mutual exclusivity of similar 
categories of cosmopolitanism and nationalism while stressing the compatibility between 
their alternative forms. That said, it is important to flag up the very real linkages that have 
bridged cultural and political varieties of both nationalism and cosmopolitanism. For 
example, so many nationalist movements made the shift from cultural to political 
objectives that Miroslav Hroch established a theory by which nationalism 'A' (cultural 
revival) leads to phase 'B' (political organisation) and thence to 'C' (mass movement). 
Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson have both isolated similar shifts from cultural to 
political phases of agitation.34  
 The script for cosmopolitanism reads in a similar manner: the length and breadth 
of history is replete with examples of the iron fist of cultural homogenisation 
accompanying the velvet glove of benign political cosmopolitanism. The Roman 
Empire's Latin-Christian cultural project, Napoleon's emphasis on French culture, and 
Khruschev's Russifying 'Soviet Man' theme demonstrate the difficulty in maintaining a 
neutral political cosmopolitanism. Even the European Union, ostensibly a culture-free 
project, seeks to capture the primary loyalties of Europe's population (as against their 
respective national identities), carefully gauging this cultural trend through instruments 
like the Eurobarometer surveys. 35  
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The link between the cultural and political partakes of other forms as well. Thus 
many a cultural cosmopolitan from Voltaire to Daniele Archibugli has entertained 
political hopes for a more globally-integrated world polity. Ulrich Beck has gone so far 
as to call for a 'cosmopolitan revolution' to establish global governance.36 Still others of 
the cultural cosmopolitan stripe have become involved in political agitation, notably Tom 
Paine and Anarchsis Cloots in the French Revolution, and Karl Marx or Leon Trotsky in 
the service of International Socialism.37 Similarly, as we shall see, pacifist, ecumenist and 
pan-European grassroots organisations have provided much of the motive force behind 
the establishment of cosmopolitan institutions like the League of Nations and European 
Union. 
 While the historical record shows an association between cultural and political 
manifestations of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, there have been enough instances of 
apolitical cosmopolitanism (i.e. philosophes) and cultural nationalism (i.e. Cornish, 
Balinese, Acadian) to warrant a careful distinction between the intellectual provinces of 
culture and politics. This is germane to our discussion since the rise of cosmopolitanism 
has assumed a more cultural hue in the United States and a more political colouring in 
Europe. Overall, though, I contend that cosmopolitanism has greatly increased its social 
force during the twentieth century. This echoes Linklater's claim that 'there has 






The Dualist Interregnum in Western Cosmopolitanism: 1789-1914 
 
 Before turning to Linklater's 'recent period,' it is worth examining the trajectory of 
cosmopolitanism during its 'dark age' from its mid-eighteenth century heyday until the 
World Wars of the twentieth century. Cosmopolitans frequently lament three turning 
points in European history. The first concerns the shift in emphasis from liberal 
cosmopolitanism to nationalism during the second phase of the French Revolution, 
between 1792 and 1794. The second involves a similar volte-face among German 
aufklärer (Enlightenment intellectuals), who turned their back on cosmopolitanism to 
embrace a romantic ethnic nationalism, beginning in 1806. And the final caesura 
concerns the nationalist fragmentation of International Socialism from 1914.  
Many scholars who have considered these turning points believe that they reflect 
the spread of the modern ideology of nationalism. These so-called 'modernist' theorists of 
nationalism assert that the norm of nationhood is a strictly post-1789 artefact. In effect, 
the pre-modern period in Europe is seen to be characterised by cosmopolitan strata of 
monarchs, warriors, nobles and clerics who preside over a diffuse social structure in 
which national sentiment is unknown. Intellectual currents reflected this cosmopolitan 
social structure. The rise of nationalism, with its mobilisation of the masses, is held to 
irrupt this longstanding pattern, fragmenting the universal whilst integrating the 
particular. The romantic movement is considered to have ushered in the intellectual 
death-knell of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. 39  
Our argument is that while the idea of nationalism became far more significant 
after 1789, no decisive break with the cosmopolitan weltanschauung transpired. Instead, 
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both nationalism and cosmopolitanism remained continuous themes throughout the 
nineteenth century. Take the historical junctures mentioned above. Many consider that a 
cosmopolitan sensibility was shattered by the exigencies of war. In the French case, the 
activity of counter-revolutionary states led the First Republic's administration to 
downgrade the citizenship status of foreigners, whilst German intellectuals reacted 
against French universalism soon after Prussia's defeat at the hands of the Grande Armée 
in 1806.40 Meanwhile, nationalist tensions related to war readily led to centrifugal 
tendencies within the Second International.41  
This analysis seems beguilingly simple, yet a story centred solely on the role of 
warfare remains problematic. Marwick has shown that wars often do not lead to lasting 
social change.42 After all, previous conflicts (i.e. Wars of Austrian and Spanish 
Succession, or the Seven Years' War) did not lead to any enduring global vogue for 
nationalism. Moreover, English, German, Latin American and Russian cosmopolitans 
continued to look to Paris as a cultural centre and to peer down their noses at the 
ethnocentric 'enthusiasms' of their respective mass publics.43 Finally, it is difficult to 
explain such stark intellectual changes from a latter-day perspective: as an exercise, 
imagine the likes of Hannah Arendt, David Mitrany or Jeremy Waldron suddenly 
espousing the nationalist credo. 
What is critical to understand, therefore, is the complex, intertwined relationship 
between ideas of nation and cosmopolis prior to the twentieth century. Both concepts 
stirred late eighteenth century hearts and minds, and continued to animate thinkers well 
into the twentieth, but their mutual contradictions were only dimly apprehended. In fact, 
this contradiction was the established mode of thinking for over a century in the western 
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world. Thus as the political environment changed (i.e. France 1792-4; Germany from 
1806, Europe in 1914), intellectuals and statesmen found it a relatively easy task to 
embrace ideas of nationalism with genuine vigour - often transmuting their equally 
authentic cosmopolitan attachments into legitimating devices for their particularist 
attachments. Accordingly, French and German liberals/socialists began to view their 
particular nation as the 'chosen' vehicle for liberal/socialist progress toward a new 
cosmopolitan civilisation.44  
Cosmopolitanism, which modernist theorists of nationalism consign to the dustbin 
of pre-modernity, in fact flourished well after 1806. To begin with, as Michael Mann 
notes, Western European society contained many cosmopolitan currents in the 
intellectual, material and political (i.e. imperial, diplomatic) realm even as the nation-
state deepened its grip on the masses.45 Consider the continuing importance of Paris as an 
intellectual and consumer fashion centre until well into the twentieth century. Despite the 
resistance of nationalists, '[turn of the century] Brazilians promoted a culture that was 
heavily imitative of Europe,' writes Thomas Skidmore, 'It was assumed that the elite 
could speak and read French fluently.46  
Closer to 'home', the cosmopolitan idea flared up in the vogue for Parisian styles 
and exotic objects stoked by the older fashion journals and newer department stores of 
nineteenth century Europe. In a fascinating study of the German trend-setting Mode 
Journal, Purdy illustrates how calls for a Prussian national civilian uniform failed to dent 
the rising influence of a Paris-oriented, modern fashion culture. This status culture, 
eagerly espoused by the German educated bourgoisie, held vernacular German attitudes, 
dress and manners in utter disdain. A counter-current of nationalism - explicitly anti-
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French - began as early as the middle decades of the eighteenth century, amplified 
somewhat during the Wars of Liberation from 1806, but did not lead to any lasting 
change in the emerging trajectory of cosmopolitan modernity.47  
In a world of growing national integration, Paris, and to a lesser extent, London, 
proved to be enduring cosmopolitan centres for intellectuals and consumers until the 
Second World War.48 The French bourgeoisie imitated courtly modes of consumption 
and indulged in a cosmopolitan 'chaotic-exotic' style which infused the department stores 
of the late nineteenth century, with their 'contradictory allusions to different ethnic, 
geographical, and even mythical themes.' The English and American bourgeoisie 
followed suit in their awe of the exotic and aristocratic, while the new World Exhibitions 
of the nineteenth century helped to expand the cosmopolitan imagination. Neither the 
populism of the French and American Revolutions, nor the moralism of the Victorian 
Protestant crusade provided any lasting bulwark against cosmopolitanism's forward 
march. The rise of such phenomena as the gothic novel, Dandyism and Bohemianism by 
the early nineteenth century confirmed the contradictory trend. 49 This cultural exchange 
helped to safeguard the new economic 'globalisation' of the period. Hence, despite the 
entrenchment of the nation-state, there occurred a synchronic expansion of trans-national 









The twin processes of nationalism and cosmopolitanism led to a remarkably 
ambiguous spirit which suffused political thinking throughout the Western world. 
American writers of the 1776-1914 period were notoriously schizophrenic, balancing the 
idea of America as a cosmopolitan melting pot with the notion of the United States as a 
purified, Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation. These ideas were held simultaneously by the 
same individuals, and this zeitgeist was the norm rather than the exception, a mental feat 
which Ralph Waldo Emerson coined 'double-consciousness.' Only with this cognitive 
structure in mind can we understand how he could sing the praises of the United States in 
1846 as the 'Asylum of all nations...the energy of Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles and 
Cossacks, and all the European tribes, of the Africans and Polynesians, will construct a 
new race...as vigorous as the new Europe which came out of the smelting pot of the Dark 
Ages.'51 Yet opine at about the same time that:  
 
It cannot be maintained by any candid person that the African race have ever 
occupied or do promise ever to occupy any very high place in the human 
family...The Irish cannot; the American Indian cannot; the Chinese cannot. Before 
the energy of the Caucasian race all other races have quailed and done 
obeisance.52  
 
Emerson's thinking should not be interpreted as that of a consistent Enlightenment 
cosmopolitan who is confining his vision to 'advanced' peoples. His vision was truly 
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dualistic, a venerable tradition of reasoning also to be found in the writings of President 
Thomas Jefferson. '[The] Gothic idea that we are to look backwards instead of 
forwards...and to recur to the annals of our ancestors for what is most perfect in 
government, in religion & in learning,' excoriated Jefferson, 'is worthy of those bigots in 
religion & Government, by whom it has been recommended, & whose purposes it would 
answer.' Yet this is the same individual who argued: 'Has not every restitution of the 
antient Saxon laws had happy effects? Is it not better now that we return at once into that 
happy system of our ancestors, the wisest and most perfect ever yet devised by the wit of 
man, as it stood before the 8th century?'53 (Kohn 1957: 150-51; Horsman 1981: 22)  
  As John Higham and others have noted, in the nineteenth century, 'Anglo-Saxon 
and cosmopolitan nationalisms merged in a happy belief that the Anglo-Saxon has a 
marvelous capacity for assimilating kindred races, absorbing their valuable qualities, yet 
remaining essentially unchanged.'54 The same habits of argument prevailed in Europe. 
The Philosophes were especially prone to the pitfalls of double-consciousness. 
Condorcet, for example, stressed the need for a universal language, yet felt French 
uniquely suited to this task; Kant spoke of the importance of cosmopolitan rights, but 
considered the negroes incapable of civilisation and the state as indispensable for 
freedom; Saint Just championed the Declaration of the Rights of Man as superior due to 
its universalist message, but in the same [1791] text, he reminded the reader that  'being 
indifferent to one's homeland…was the source of all evils.'55  
How were such views reconciled? Consider the following tortured reasoning. In 
1792, Christian Garve, the German fashion writer, argued along cosmopolitan lines that 
the cross-fertilisation of fashion, as with language, was beneficial to civilisation. All this 
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for nationalistic reasons: such a system would help to reduce Germans' fetishism of the 
foreign!56 Or reflect upon Novalis' communiqué to Friedrich Schlegel, soon after the 
French arrived in Prussia, that 'Germanity is cosmopolitanism mixed with the most 
powerful [national] individuality.' A century later, Friedrich Meinecke, in his important 
tome, Cosmopolitanism (1907) would demonstrate the same pull of conflicting emotions: 
'The best German national feeling also includes the cosmopolitan ideal of a humanity 
beyond nationality.'57  
Mazzini's thinking provides us with a further window into nineteenth century 
dualism. This Italian nationalist believed that the raison d'être of the nation is to mobilise 
individuals for their duty to all of humanity. He advocated Italian national unification as a 
prelude to a United States of Europe, and even founded an organisation called 'Young 
Europe' (along the lines of his nationalist 'Young Italy') to advance this aim. It would 
have been interesting to see whether, in practice, Mazzini would be prepared to cede 
hard-won Italian sovereignty to this new supranational body.58 Even Count Arthur de 
Gobineau, who championed Nordic superiority in the mid-nineteenth century, reflected 
the contradictory spirit of the age. 'It would be unjust to assert that every [race] mixture is 
bad and harmful,' Gobineau averred. 'Artistic genius, which is equally foreign to each of 
the three great [race] types arose only after the intermarriage of white and 
black....Although the whites are the most beautiful of the original races, the most 
beautiful people of all have come from the marriage of white and black.'59  
Taken at once, western political thought from the Enlightenment to the early 
twentieth century displays a strong yearning for both cosmopolitanism and nationalism, 
and a marked tendency to conflate irreconcilable elements within the two ideas.60 The 
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growing institutional reflexivity of twentieth century society, however, coupled with its 
great wars, helped to sharpen the conceptual boundary between cosmopolitanism and 
nationalism, a boundary which actualised itself in the form of distinct (and conflicting) 
political actors.61  Twentieth century cosmopolitans, unlike their nineteenth century 
predecessors, possessed little ambivalence toward nationalism: they accepted the 
contradiction between key tenets of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, and were prepared 
to endorse the former at the expense of the latter.  
 
The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in the Twentieth Century 
 
Cultural Cosmopolitanism in the United States 
 
The retreat from dualism made an immediate impact upon the American 
intellectual and political scene. The first political actor to champion a refined, anti-
nationalist cosmopolitanism was the American Liberal Progressive movement. 
Coalescing in Chicago by 1905, the Liberal Progressives actively espoused cosmopolitan 
visions of their nation, championed a 'colour-blind' immigration policy against prevailing 
nativist currents, and strenuously tried to interact with new immigrants via the 
burgeoning 'Settlement House' reform movement.62  
Significantly, a number of important cosmopolitan organisations - in addition to 
the 'Settlements' at Chicago and New York - were formed during this period, and many 
had Liberal Progressive links. These included the National Association for the 
Advancement of Coloured People (1909), the Immigrant Protective Association (1908) 
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and the Liberal Progressive caucus within the federal government-sponsored 
Americanisation Committee.63 These joined with pro-immigration business interests to 
defeat restrictionist immigration legislation in 1912, and (unsuccessfully) challenged 
subsequent legislation in 1917, 1921 and 1924.64 In spite of this, cosmopolitan activities 
were limited in scale, despite the fact that several famous individuals (i.e. John Dewey, 
Jane Addams, William James) were affiliated with Liberal Progressivism. The Liberal 
Progressives become significant in the broader sweep of the century, however, as their 
consistently cosmopolitan ideas exercised ever greater sway over the American cultural 
elite. The two world wars provided an important stimulus to cosmopolitan ideas, as did a 
more general evolution in western liberal thought. 
The first quantum leap in influence came with the Federal Council of Churches' 
adoption of Liberal-Progressive ideas pertaining to citizenship and immigration between 
1910 and 1914.65 The FCC was the ecumenical body overseeing American Protestantism. 
Though its influence at the congregational level should not be exaggerated, the FCC's 
vast organisational reach and cultural influence far exceeded that of most secular 
organisations. Beginning with the 1910 World Council of Churches conference on Faith 
and Order and continuing through to the FCC's fifth quadrennial meeting in Atlanta 
(1924), the Anglo-Protestant crusade took a back seat to themes of global ecumenical 
unity, racial tolerance and world peace.66  
 Furthermore, the first Interfaith (Protestant-Catholic-Jewish) chaplaincy 
committee was sponsored by the FCC during World War I, and was headed by a 
Catholic, John Burke.67 The FCC was also a force behind the Goodwill movement which 
mobilised in defense of Catholics and Jews during the high-tide of Ku Klux Klan revival 
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and nationalist agitation of 1918-24.68 The FCC similarly provided the primary support 
base for the League of Nations in the United States and pressed for a more generous 
admissions policy for Jewish refugees during the Second World War.69
 The spread of liberal-cosmopolitan notions (racial equality, liberal immigration, 
universalistic national identity) in the secular sphere proceeded apace after World War I, 
reaching a 'hegemonic' critical mass among intellectual elites by the 1930s. In the field of 
historiography, for instance, the romantic nationalist posture (whether Anglo-Saxonist or 
Protestant) that reigned during the nineteenth century was replaced with more 'scientific' 
and/or liberal-socialist interpretations that glorified the industrial immigrant. The central 
place of 'old-stock' American pioneers like the Puritans, Founding Fathers or Jacksonian 
frontiersmen in the national narrative came to be similarly questioned.70  
The modest flow of anti-racist literature of the 1930s became a torrent during the 
1940s, influencing federal government elites on both sides of the political divide for the 
first time. The Progressive Education Association's Committee on Intercultural Education 
(1937), the Common Council of American Unity, and the Office of Education's 
'Americans All' broadcasts on the contributions of particular ethnic groups (1938-39) 
represented the front end of this new effort.71 The 1930s was also the period in which 
Emma Lazarus' paean to the world's immigrant 'masses yearning to breathe free' was 
inserted at the base of the Statue of Liberty, transforming the monument into a symbol of 
American universalism and openness to immigration.72 This directly shaped the 
understandings of a new generation through history textbooks, which usually featured 
pictures of the statue alongside talk of immigrant contributions and the American 
universal melting-pot.73
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Republican presidential nominee Wendell Willkie's best-selling One World 
(1943) and President Harry Truman's post-war policies (i.e. de-segregating the military, 
pressing for a repeal of the immigration quota system) demonstrated that cosmopolitan 
ideas had come to form part of a new 'consensus' politics based on liberal idealism and 
the imperatives of the Cold War.74 Willkie, for instance, announced in the middle of the 
war that 'Our nation is composed of no one race, faith, or cultural heritage. It is a 
grouping of some thirty peoples….'75 Truman echoed this ten years later when he 
(unsuccessfully) vetoed 1952 legislation that continued the restrictionist provisions of the 
1924 'National Origins' quota immigration law. In so doing, Truman, whose allies in the 
state department failed to triumph over the Coalition of Patriotic Societies and their 
conservative allies in Congress, accused their opponents of violating the American creed 
and St. Paul's New Testament injunction that there be 'neither Jew nor Greek.'76  
Truman ultimately proved to be swimming with the tide of history, and the decade 
of the 1960s ushered in a cosmopolitan revolution that had been building since the mid-
1930s. On the cultural front, both the nation's motion picture industry and its literature 
moved to embrace a broader, post-WASP definition of the nation.77 Meanwhile, the 
newly activist Supreme Court, in a series of decisions between 1962 and 1964, called for 
the reapportionment of population between electoral districts. This ended the over-
representation of Protestant rural and Southern voters in Congress as a Democratic 
majority in both houses emerged in 1964.78 The Democrats' victory ensured the passage 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Hart-Celler immigration bill which put an end 
to the geographic immigration quotas of the 1924 National Origins system.  
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The last component of this cosmopolitan revolution occurred on the plane of 
popular (as opposed to elite) attitudes and behaviour. This was so for several reasons. 
First, the number of 18-24 year-olds in college rose from 15 percent in 1950 to nearly a 
third in 1970.79 Given the cosmopolitan perspective of the post-World War I generation 
of professors vis à vis the rest of the population, university expansion undoubtedly 
opened up a powerful outlet for mass value change. Television provided another medium 
of transmission for the elite's new cosmopolitan mindset: the proportion of households 
with sets jumped from 9 percent in 1950 to 93 percent in 1965.80  
In consequence, between 1945 and 1970, white American attitudes toward a host 
of cultural issues became markedly more cosmopolitan. In terms of immigration, 
American attitudes relaxed considerably between the war and 1965.81 Questions 
pertaining to race and religion exposed similar changes. In 1944, for example, 52 percent 
of whites endorsed the idea that 'white people should have the first chance at any kind of 
job,' by 1972, just 3 percent did. More importantly, the number of white Americans 
opposed to black-white intermarriage fell from 94 percent in 1958 to 56 percent in 1983. 
Similar changes were noted on questions regarding inter-faith marriage. Once again, the 
period of greatest change was 1960-70.82  
All told, the combined effects of social reflexivity, ideological evolution, and the 
post-industrial boom in higher education resulted in the hegemonic rise of a trans-ethnic 
cosmopolitanism. Some may aver that this was merely a liberal-progressive movement 
akin to those which extended the privileges of citizenship to wider class and gender 
fractions in the western world. Yet the American trajectory was far more radical than this, 
for it not only took steps to include the marginalised (a strategy which might have been 
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combined with the retention of ethnic boundaries) but rather championed a national 
identity divorced from pre-modern ethnic roots. This implied a major revolution of 
consciousness on the part of the dominant Anglo-Protestant group and a broad 
acquiescence among many ethnic groups in favour of a loose-bounded society with few 
existential anchors. If we accept - as do Hannerz and Waldron - that cosmopolitanism can 
be a cultural phenomenon occurring within the individual or national community, then 
this surely qualifies as an instance of enhanced cosmopolitanism. Though European 
nations followed the American example after the 1960's, their break with the ethnic past - 
as we shall see - has been more protracted and partial than in the American case.  
The surge of liberal cultural cosmopolitanism that sprang up in the U.S. had some 
political outriders. For instance, American NGO support was critical for the success of 
the international Peace and ecumenical movements as well as the launch of both the 
League of Nations and U.N.83 However, the failure of the League and the rise of 
American unilateralism - then as now - showed that political cosmopolitanism had 
shallow roots compared with its cultural cousin, which proved a far more enduring force. 
 
The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Europe 
 
We have catalogued the astounding cultural changes that transformed American 
society into a more cosmopolitan entity. Can we see a similar pattern in the European 
case? In cultural terms, the answer is cautiously in the affirmative. Western European 
states, powered by reflexive modernisation, more clearly delineated their citizenship 
criteria, ethnic boundaries and immigration control practices in the early twentieth 
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century.84 Yet since World War II, and especially the late 1960s, many have relaxed these 
boundaries, moving away from ethnic conceptions toward citizenship criteria of jus soli. 
In tandem with this, European national identities have begun to be reconstituted as 
narratives of pluralistic history and multicultural destiny. Moreover, multiculturalism in 
the European context often encompasses a recognition of minority rights and improved 
rights for non-citizen residents.85 This role extends to EU foreign policy: the Organisation 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and a panel from the Council of Europe 
routinely monitors the citizenship practices of EU candidate states like Estonia, often 
rebuking the latter for adopting exclusionary practices toward ethnic minorities.86
 Even so, it is clear that such changes have not been as readily accepted as in the 
United States.87 In many parts of both Western and Eastern Europe, the ethno-nationalist 
far-right has grown in political importance in recent decades. Meanwhile, even the most 
liberal societies at Europe’s centre (such as Germany) have had difficulty 
institutionalising a sense of national identity divorced from their historic ethnic core.88 
This sense of cultural anxiety has carried forth into the Schengen agreement for 
preserving the integrity of Europe's frontiers and citizenship laws and highlights the 
limits of cultural cosmopolitanism in the EU.  
Political strides toward supranational integration are therefore the more striking 
feature of Europe's twentieth century development. We mentioned earlier that 
ideologically-driven grassroots organising could spawn trans-national political structures 
and continue to energise them after their foundation. This is clear in the case of 
nationalism, where nationalist organisations like the American patriotic societies (not to 
mention European nationalist parties and leaders) repeatedly shaped public policy.  
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With a reverse ideological charge, the same process accounts for the emergence 
and perpetuation of the European Union. The idea of a politically-united Europe had been 
in circulation since the middle ages, but schemes for European unity - often coalescing 
around motifs of Christendom and Rome - fell on deaf ears for centuries. In the twentieth 
century, by contrast, the idea took political flight. Why this sudden shift in the fortunes of 
a long impotent idea? This paper would respond by pointing to a constellation of 
developments running in parallel to the American case. Namely, a) a refinement of 
cosmopolitan ideology; b) a growth in cosmopolitan grassroots organising; and c) the rise 
of an educated 'New Class', which helped to institutionalise cosmopolitan ideas at the 
national, and by extension international, levels.89
 Paradoxically, the reflexive processes which led to tighter citizenship controls and 
immigration laws in early twentieth century Europe prompted cosmopolitan thinking to 
become more rigorous and stimulated the growth of 'internationalist' social movements. 
For the first time, the centrality of the nationalist canon came under sustained attack from 
European cosmopolitan intellectuals. This is most clearly evident in the realm of 
historiography. Prior to 1914, even those who advocated a 'scientific' approach to history, 
like Leopold von Ranke and Max Weber, championed their particular nationalist cause.90 
However, after the First World War, the nationalistic mode of historiography began to 
fade - particularly in Britain, but also in other western European intellectual circles. In 
Britain, the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), an internationalist academic pressure 
group, was instrumental in this process. Formed in 1914, the UDC's writ soon ran 
through much of the English-speaking world. As Paul Kennedy notes, after 1919, the 
UDC's books circulated widely and were 'accepted almost completely in the English and 
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American universities.'91 Their tone was distinctly cosmopolitan and derisive of 
nationalist shibboleths. For instance, in one UDC pamphlet, J.A. Hobson sought to 
redefine internationalism as a relation between peoples rather than states.92  
The professionalisation and specialisation of history in twentieth century Europe, 
two reflexive practices with clear counterparts in the United States, helped sift a more 
consistent cosmopolitanism from the dualistic chaff of nineteenth century 
historiography.93 Synchronically, International Socialism underwent cosmopolitan reform 
between the Second (1889-1917) and Third (1919-43) Internationals. Whereas western 
European socialists of the First and Second Internationals generally supported 
colonialism, characterised non-Europeans as too backward for socialist revolution, and 
gave primary loyalty to their own nation-states, the Third International was a truly global, 
anti-colonialist project.94  
In the meantime, forces of social reflexivity intensified communication networks, 
propelling cosmopolitan social movements from obscurity to prominence within decades. 
The Peace movement, for instance, had sprung up on both sides of the Atlantic as early as 
1815, but had little to show for itself until the First World War. By this time, the 
movement had become powerful enough in the United States to be able to fan support for 
world federalism and provide the blueprint for President Wilson's League of Nations. 
However, the Peace movement was also active in Europe, particularly in Britain and 
France. In Britain, the pacifist Federal Union advocated world federalism in a number of 
best-selling publications beginning just before the First World War. A stream of 
influential inter-war pacifist writers like Norman Angell, Bertrand Russell, J.A. Hobson 
and Alfred Zimmern helped to establish the pedigree of British cosmopolitanism.95 
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Meanwhile, the League of Nations Union and its associated Federation of League of 
Nations Societies (which Zimmern helped to found in 1917) boasted a skyrocketing 
membership which reached more than a million by the 1920s.96
Though the Peace movement tended to encompass a global worldview, 
connections between movements for peace, world unity and European integration 
become increasingly evident by the 1920s. In Britain, for example, Quaker pacifists 
already supported the idea of a United States of Europe by 1910, the National Peace 
League adopted the same stance in 1911 and a European Unity League was formed in 
1913. In France, the International League for Peace and Freedom, Proudhon Society and 
the French chapters of the League for Peace through Law, the League for International 
Friendship and the League of the Rights of Man were prominent campaigners for 
European political integration. Indeed, the latter organisation alone counted some 
200,000 members by the mid-1920s.97  
The rising volume of pan-European civic activity in the 1920s, which we shall 
consider in a moment, was driven primarily by a supranational idealism strongly linked to 
the cosmopolitanism of the Peace movement. In no sense were these pan-Europeanists 
promoting a European super-nation. 'A United States of Europe has now become the 
order of the day,' declared the Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, a leading 
pan-European of the 1920's. 'The League of Nations has become its foundation stone. A 
World Republic should be the final step.'98 Tellingly, Coudenhove aired his pan-
European views at the Twenty-Third World Peace Congress in Berlin (1924) and his 
writing conceived of a united Europe as part of a broader world-governmental fabric. He 
also singled out nationalists as the principal obstacle to his ideas.99 In the same manner, 
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French foreign minister and pan-European Aristide Briand's cosmopolitan concerns were 
reflected in initiatives on both world peace (Geneva Protocols) and European federalism 
(Memorandum on a United Europe).100  
It is this intensification of pro-European social movements, largely within nation-
states like France, that helped to breathe political life into the centuries-old 'European 
Idea'. Cosmopolitan dynamism was reflected in the logarithmic expansion of pro-
European writing - in the form of journals, books and pamphlets - during the 1920s.101 
More important, we find cosmopolitan thinking accompanied by determined and 
organised political action. This marks a significant historical departure as the 
cosmopolitan idea - in its European guise - attained the critical mass of social capital 
necessary for realisation.102  
Let us consider the most important example. Coudenhove-Kalergi penned his 
visionary work, Pan-Europa in German in 1923, his new journal, Paneuropa, appeared in 
1924, and his first important political convert was Chancellor Seipel of Austria, who 
provided Coudenhove's organisation, Pan-European Union, with a new headquarters in 
Hofburg Palace.103 Nonetheless, the Count found his primary audience and highest-level 
contacts in France. Aristide Briand, French premier during the painful war years of 1915-
17, was one sympathiser with whom Coudenhove would later connect, as was the 
contemporary French premier Edouard Herriot, who spoke out in favour of a 'United 
States of Europe' in 1924 and 1925. 104
By 1926, the Count was in France, conferring with political leaders like Herriot, 
Louis Loucheur and Leon Blum. A year later, Briand, impressed by Coudenhove's 
activity, and now French foreign minister, decided to openly endorse the pan-European 
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movement. Loucheur, meanwhile, became president of the French section of the Pan-
European Union, and in 1927, Coudenhove and other pan-Europeanists were received at 
both the French Ministry of War and the Quai D'Orsay. Aristide Briand announced that 
he was prepared to serve as honorary president of the Pan-European Union. All of this 
activity was eagerly covered by the daily newspapers, and most on the French centre-left 
fully supported the idea of European political union in the late twenties.105  
The pan-European movement's stock of social capital was rising fast, centred 
largely on intensifying social networks in France. By the late twenties, as we saw, several 
French politicians were sympathetic to this cosmopolitan cause. Aristide Briand is a 
pivotal figure in this regard, and his outline for a Federal Europe, presented during the 
tenth session of the League of Nations in 1929 generated a storm of controversy and 
irrevocably placed the European idea on the political agenda. A year later, the French 
foreign ministry prepared its Memorandum on a Federal Europe and sent it to European 
governments for consideration. This represents the first time in history that a European 
supranationalist proposal was considered by Europe's officials.106  
Briand's proposals were roundly attacked by the right-wing nationalist press in 
France and throughout Europe, underscoring the conflict between Briand's notions of 
political cosmopolitanism and the core doctrine of political nationalism. But they had 
gained the first rung on the ladder toward realisation, demonstrating the rising importance 
of political cosmopolitanism in Europe.107  
The focus of European integrationist scholars on the post-war era, suggests John 
Loughlin, ignores the significant lines of continuity with the inter-war period.108 The 
1930s were more difficult years for pan-Europeans due to the rise of fascism. Yet the 
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European idea enjoyed a vibrant currency among French progressive intellectuals of the 
thirties, and reached its zenith in British intellectual circles during 1939-40.109 In France, 
pan-Europeanists retained the political capital they had gained in the twenties. 110 
Meanwhile, Coudenhove's Pan-European Congresses and diplomatic initiatives 
continued, culminating in the formation of his political pressure group for Pan-Europa at 
Westminster in 1939.111 The war years drove the European idea underground, where it 
was universally championed by non-communist resistance movements against the 
Nazis.112 This was powerfully expressed by the Manifesto of the European Resistance 
published at Geneva in 1944, in which nationalism and national boundaries were singled 
out as a primary cause of war and human misery.113  
Resurfacing after the war, pan-Europeanism benefited from the genial political 
opportunity structure of Cold War American and British approval. Even so, the 
lineaments of the path-dependent force imparted to it by pro-Europeanists of the interwar 
period were clearly visible. In recognition of this, Winston Churchill, who had sent a 
letter of approval to Coudenhove-Kalergi to coincide with the 1943 Pan-European 
congress in New York, consulted the latter before making his famous pro-European 
speech of 1946. This speech pointedly invoked the legacy of the recently deceased 
Briand.114 Furthermore, after the war, a number of important pro-European organisations 
formed (or re-formed). These included, among others: the United European Movement, 
French Council for a United Europe, European League for Economic Co-operation, 
Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe, European Union of Federalists and 
the European Parliamentary Union.  
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Continuities with pre-war pan-Europeanism abound in these organisations. Thus 
Herriot was honorary president of the French Council, while Coudenhove was the 
inspiration behind the Parliamentary Union. Importantly, these pedigrees reached into the 
formative institutions of the European Union, highlighting the connections between the 
inter-war social movements and the institutions of an incipient European Community. 
Van Zeeland of the European League for Economic Co-operation was thus a signatory of 
the formative Treaty of Paris (1951), while Spinelli of the European Union of Federalists 
became EEC commissioner. Meanwhile, Alcide de Gasperi, Italian prime minister from 
1945-53 and a key figure in the emergence of the EEC, had pre-war links to both the 
Peace and pan-European movements.115  
The central point here is that determined, idealistic, political action - more so than 
functional needs, globalising networks or any interest-based calculus - provided the 
chrysalis for European integration. Even functionalism often appears as a smokescreen 
for a more idealistic Europeanism. For example, early European functionalists like David 
Mitrany and Ernst Haas were committed internationalists and pan-Europeans.116 
Furthermore, ur-proponents of economic union, such as the leaders of the Committee for 
a European Customs Union (1924) were idealists who favoured political union in the 
strongest terms.117 Economic unification, which played an important role in Briand's 
proposals of 1929-30 and in the early EEC and ECSC treaties, should be similarly viewed 
as a strategic first step toward political union which in no way precluded more radical 
political designs.118
 Finally, though grassroots pan-Europeanism no longer provides the momentum 
behind further integration, the impact of cosmopolitan ideology is a recurrent theme. 
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Well after the EEC's formation, for example, European integration drew strength from 
idealistic, committed bureaucrats in the European Commission and pro-European 
politicians in the member states.119 One of the social wellsprings of this ideology is what 
Daniel Bell and Alvin Gouldner term the 'New Class', which is somewhat analogous to 
Ronald Inglehart's 'postmaterialist' category. This sector of post-industrial societies tends 
to be liberal on cultural issues, university-educated, and drawn from relatively younger 
age cohorts.120 It is also more likely than other sectors of the population to identify with 
Europe or the world rather than nation or locale.121  
As in the American and Australian cases, education is key. In a recent study of 
anti-EU sentiment in France and Norway, higher levels of education were found to be 
positively correlated with pro-European sentiment and inversely correlated with anti-
immigrant attitudes.122 This effect is strikingly noticeable among younger age cohorts, 
where education is a strong (inverse) predictor of support for the nationalist far right and 
restrictive immigration policies.123 With the expansion of higher education in western 
Europe since 1945 (and especially post-1960), there has been an observable tendency 
toward reduced national pride and a greater embrace of liberal-cosmopolitan values, 





 This article considers three aspects of the cosmopolitan-nationalist question that 
have been largely ignored in the empirical literature on the subject. Namely, a) the 
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dualism of much pre-twentieth century cosmopolitan thought; b) the twentieth century 
expansion and political success of grassroots cosmopolitanism in the West against its 
nationalist adversaries; and c) the relative cultural inflection of American 
cosmopolitanism as compared with the political variety espoused by its European 
counterpart. The paper suggests that in the twentieth century, cosmopolitanism gained 
influence in the West at the expense of nationalism. In the United States, this 
cosmopolitanism expressed itself primarily in cultural terms: as a trans-ethnic movement 
of social reform. In Europe, the focus was largely political, emphasising the trans-
national project of European unification. 
 The initial dynamics of change were threefold: 1) the intellectual evolution of 
liberal-cosmopolitan logic during 1900-14 which began to regard nationalism as 
reactionary; 2) the impact of mass warfare during 1914-45 which accelerated the anti-
nationalist tendency within cosmopolitan thought; and 3) the atmosphere of increased 
societal reflexivity, which magnified the previous development and spawned the 
intensive (and later extensive) networks which helped to institutionalise cosmopolitan 
ideas. These associational networks were initially national rather than trans-national, 
even as they conveyed a cosmopolitan message. Western nationalist associations, by 
contrast, which attained prompt political success in tandem with democratic, anti-
imperial or fascist revolts during 1789-1945, failed to maintain a similar momentum in 
the second half of the twentieth century. 
The dualistic, 'cosmopolitan-nationalist' nineteenth century imagination was one 
casualty of the three aforementioned forces. Nationalist political hegemony was another. 
Beginning in France and the United States, cosmopolitan national networks and their 
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'organic intellectuals' gained elite sponsorship, enhancing the social capital of their ideas. 
Trans-national networks followed, rather than led, these developments. The subsequent 
expansion of higher education and a centralised television media helped to spawn the 
'New Class' that cemented the cosmopolitan transformation of western societies. 
Multicultural national narratives and 'colour-blind' immigration policies were one 
consequence, support for European integration another. 
 This is not to say that cosmopolitanism has won the day. Far from it. Important 
reservoirs of American nationalism remain, symbolised by the unilateralism of the Bush 
administration and the cultural nationalism of organisations like U.S. English or Pat 
Buchanan's America First. Likewise, euro-skepticism, pervasive inter-governmentalism 
within the EU and the ethnic nationalism of the Far Right place an upper limit on 
European cosmopolitanism. Finally, the handful of significant minority nationalists in the 
EU, though generally pro-European, insist on a high degree of political self-
determination. These countercurrents do not however alter this article's central thrust: that 
cosmopolitans have gained significant territory from nationalists in the late twentieth 
century West.  
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